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ABSTRACT
Dating back at least to Adam Smith (1790), philosophers and researchers expect that
people will behave differently when they know their actions are observable to others. We
hypothesize that financial reporting reveals managers’ actions and leads them to take
different actions that are better aligned with investor interests. We posit that the reason
why is the activation of our internal mental self-evaluation that Smith refers to as an
“Impartial Spectator.” We test this hypothesis with an experiment in which we
manipulate the availability of a financial report that makes managerial actions
transparent. Our evidence shows that financial reporting leads a manager to choose
reinvestment and resource sharing actions that are better aligned with investor interests,
even in a sparse experimental setting where the investor can impose no cost or confer no
reward on the manager. This same effect holds in a setting where the investor can shut
down the firm at any point and take a sizable portion of the assets. Our evidence is
important because it suggests that part of financial reporting’s economic value comes
from its enabling moral evaluation by the manager in addition to its traditional
contracting function
Keywords: Financial reporting, Blameworthy, Praiseworthy, Moral sentiments, Selfregulation
JEL codes: C92, D82, D91, M40
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“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants.”
Louis Brandeis (1914, 92)
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Introduction
Disclosure of a financial report can alter equity prices if the disclosure leads

investors to trade differently, or it can result in penalties when contracts are tied to
financial statement data (e.g., when low interest coverage triggers default). Indirect costs
can also result when a forthcoming financial report leads a manager to act preemptively
to avoid a contractual constraint tied to reported numbers. Is it possible also that a
forthcoming financial report can lead to differences in managerial behavior even when
direct valuation or contracting consequences are absent, and if so, why would such effects
occur? We hypothesize that when managers know that a forthcoming report will reveal
their actions, the manager’s internal moral sentiments will lead their actions to differ
favorably for investors. We experimentally test for the presence of such effects in a
sparse, clean setting where financial reporting can confer no valuation or contracting
benefit.
Our predictions derive from the moral sentiments of individuals that Adam Smith
(1759/1780) hypothesized to be the foundation for economic exchange (see also Smith
and Wilson, 2017; 2019).1 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), Smith hypothesizes
that individual moral action arises from a hypothetical “Impartial Spectator” that comes
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A sentiment is an “affection of the heart from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue
or vice must ultimately depend” (Smith, 1759/1780, 18). We thus define a moral sentiment as a feeling
(both emotional and cognitive) that another person is intentionally benefited or harmed by an action that
serves to define the propriety of that action.

to exist within an actor’s mind through life experience. This Impartial Spectator judges an
action’s propriety in light of extant moral customs and norms. We hypothesize that
transparent financial reporting enables an investor to judge the propriety of managerial
actions; this in turn leads managers to take more investor-beneficial reinvestment,
dividend, and self-compensation actions than they would in the absence of reporting.
The assumption at the heart of Smith’s TMS is that people take self-beneficial
actions and avoid self-harmful actions. Personal experience teaches us to recognize and
judge like-minded actions by others. Through this we learn which of our actions will likely
earn others’ praise (blame), and gradually we come to favor (disfavor) taking such actions.
Moral sentiments develop because an actor comes to believe that an action (1) is
inherently praiseworthy regardless of whether anyone discovers that the action was
taken and (2) will actually be praised by others if they learn of the action taken (Smith and
Wilson, 2017, 35–36).2 We argue that a transparent financial report revealing a manager’s
resource allocation actions activates such moral sentiments within managers and results
in manager actions that ultimately increase investor wealth.
Our experiment uses a six-period reinvestment game where, after every period
except the final one, the manager divides earnings between an investor dividend, selfcompensation, and reinvestment of remaining resources to increase future earnings.
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The desire to be viewed positively by others was recognized by foundational Western thinkers before
Adam Smith. It is found in the works of Plato, and in modern psychological theories of self-presentation and
impression management (we thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out). However, we use the
framework of Smith and Wilson because they explicitly model the tradeoff between intrinsic and monetary
utility, which allows us to make specific predictions on how financial reporting affects managers’ actions
about reinvestment and resource sharing.

2

After the final period, the manager divides remaining resources (i.e., cumulative earnings
net of prior dividends and compensation) between the investor and herself.
We manipulate two features of this reinvestment game. One is the availability of
a financial report at the end of each period that provides complete information about the
manager’s actions; the investor can observe earnings and net assets free from bias and
noise but cannot directly impose a sanction on a manager for acting contrary to investor
interests. We interpret this manipulation as evidence of financial reporting. Financial
reporting in real firms can illuminate some, but not all, of the manager’s actions, so our
first experimental manipulation provides a powerful means for making behavior
observable and transparent.
Our second manipulation lessens power differences between the parties by giving
the investor a right to end the game at any time and obtain a nearly equal share of the
net assets remaining within the firm. This manipulation allows us to test whether investor
and managerial actions are robust to differences in the relative power of the manager.
We test two hypotheses. The first is whether a manager’s final distribution to the
investor is greater when financial reporting is available even if the investor has no
recourse against a manager. We test this hypothesis controlling for the prior actions of
both the manager and the investor. Our second hypothesis is that financial reporting
prompts the manager to increase reinvestments before the final period by reducing either
manager self-compensation or investor dividends in earlier periods, or both.
Our evidence supports both hypotheses. First, after controlling for prior
compensation, dividends, and investment, managers distribute significantly higher
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amounts in the final period when reporting is present compared to when reporting is
absent. Statistically, this manifests as a significant main effect for financial reporting in
ANOVA models that compare final distribution levels across four treatments that vary by
presence of reporting and the investor liquidation option. We also document a qualitative
shift toward (away from) praiseworthy (neutral) final distribution levels paid to investors
when financial reporting is available.
Consistent with our second hypothesis, financial reporting is associated with
higher reinvestment rates in periods 1–5, accompanied by reductions in both investor
dividends and manager self-compensation. That is, the presence of financial reporting
leads both investors and managers to forgo early periods’ personal earnings and generate
higher earnings in later periods.
Our analysis reveals other interesting behavior beyond what our formal
hypotheses predicted. First, investors invest larger amounts when financial reporting is
present. This suggests that the economic value of reporting in our experiment lies in the
beneficial discretionary behavior it prompts for both investors and managers. Second, in
the absence of the investor liquidation option, we find no evidence that a more egalitarian
distribution of power increases overall gains. Finally, we note that manager participants
are not behaving as pure altruists who passively split gains equally with investors. While
managers distribute amounts in the final period that correlate with past investments,
managers also capture a larger share of total wealth than investors in all treatments.
Adam Smith’s (1759/1790) conception of human morality is central to the
development of our hypotheses; we suggest that financial reporting’s value arises, at least
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in part, from the morality it evokes. The internal Impartial Spectator is admittedly
unobservable, as are any moral sentiments activated in our experimental setting. Other
experimental research also finds that people act altruistically, and sometimes more so,
when they are physically observed in dictator games (e.g., Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006)
and public good games (e.g., Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004). One of
our contributions is that we provide a rationale for this observed behavior.
Competing theoretical candidates for altruistic actions in trust games include
reciprocity (Ostrom and Walker, 2003), where trust is repaid with trustworthiness
(Rousseau, et al 1998). However, reciprocity alone cannot explain our results. In our
experiment, both with and without financial reporting, the manager observes how much
has been invested and chooses how to repay the investor’s trust; therefore there should
be no treatment effects of financial reporting. This is also true of distributional or “other
regarding” preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmit, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), which
predict that an idea of what is fair, not the investor’s knowledge of what is being
distributed, should shape a manager’s choices.
Another candidate for behavior in repeated games is reputation building, where
one type of manager takes actions to signal their type or to mimic the actions of another
type in an attempt to dupe investors (Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2016; Liang, Marinovic,
and Varas, 2018). Although this explanation is consistent with the observed differences
in a manager’s reinvestment with and without financial reporting, it is inconsistent with
the observed final distribution, where, again, we should find no treatment differences.

5

Prior research has documented that financial reporting, or increased disclosure, is
correlated with manager behavior (e.g, Bushman and Smith, 2001; Leuz and Wysocki,
2016; Rong, 2018, Roychowdhury, Shroff, and Verdi, 2019). Our findings suggest this
result may not be due solely to underlying constraints that result from compensation
contracts based on reported accounting numbers (e.g., Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Dutta
and Gigler, 2002); our findings suggest that regardless of how a report is used, financial
reporting can encourage a manager to act in owners’ interests. That is, we find that
financial reporting restricts manager self-dealing, even when investors cannot use reports
to directly discipline the manager. This result suggests a deeper complementarity
between financial reporting and governance.
The broader meaning of our findings is that financial reporting, at least within the
context of our experiment, can have economic value even when opportunities for
contracting and settling up through ex post sanctions are not feasible. These findings
suggest a deeper role for financial reporting linked to the moral underpinnings of trust
within modern economies.3 In this sense, our study complements prior experiments on
the foundations of accounting that demonstrate how accounting records and disclosures
promote beneficial exchange by improving the memory of past interactions (Basu et al.,
2009) and enable discretionary actions that can increase both managers’ and investors’
wealth (Lunawat et al., 2020). Our study also extends the “humanomics” model and

3

The usual caveat about the external validity of findings obtained from a controlled laboratory experiment
(i.e., student participants, anonymity, scale of compensation) applies in our case too.
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evidence in Smith and Wilson (2017; 2019) to settings with core accounting institutions
like reporting.
We describe the structure of our experiment and develop hypotheses in the next
section. We then describe procedures for running the experiment and collecting data.
Empirical evidence is then reported, and the article concludes in a final section.
2

Experimental Structure and Hypothesis Development

2.1 The Reinvestment Game
Consider a game that will last six periods, as depicted in Figure 1A.4 The manager is
endowed with a production technology that yields earnings from investment during the
period. The results from investment are represented by a stochastic multiplier that can
assume a value of 1, 2, or 3 with equal probability. The total earnings from investment
during the period equal the realized multiplier multiplied by the total amount invested at
the start of the period.
The total resources invested at the start of a period come from two sources. First,
the investor receives a new endowment of capital (5 monetary units, or MUs) every
period that can be invested in the firm. Second, beginning at the end of period 1, the
manager can choose to reinvest resources rather than take a salary or pay a dividend.
Reinvestment generates earnings identical to those generated by new investments from
the investor. At the end of every period 1–5, the manager receives earnings from
investment and then divides this amount between (1) a salary that is put into the
manager’s private account, (2) a dividend that is put into the investor’s private account,

4

The reinvestment game is inspired by Lunawat (2009) and LaRiviere, McMahon, and Neilson (2017).
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and (3) a reinvestment that is placed in a joint-savings account that can generate earnings
in the next period.
At the end of the sixth and final period, the manager receives the earnings and
distributes them between the investor and herself. Total investor earnings for the
experiment equal the sum of endowments not invested in periods 1 – 6, interim dividends
received during periods 1 – 5, and the final distribution in period 6. The manager’s total
earnings equal the salaries taken in periods 1 – 5 and the final distribution taken in period
6.
We manipulate two factors within a 2×2 between-subjects design where all subject
pairs play the Reinvestment Game for a maximum of six periods. In the Baseline
treatment, only the manager can observe the balance of the manager’s personal account,
the realized multiplier, earnings, and the joint-savings account balance.
As our primary manipulation, in the Reporting treatment, at the end of each period,
we make a financial report available to the investor, whereby the investor is also informed
of the total earnings for the period, the manager’s salary during the period, and the jointsavings balance to be reinvested for the next period. In this respect, observability
eliminates all information asymmetry in our experimental setting so that the
manipulation provides a powerful test of our hypothesis that transparent financial
reporting leads to changes in managerial actions in the absence of contracts and
sanctions.5 In the game (and for public corporations), investors’ investment is seen by the
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That is, the use of a transparent financial report free from noise eliminates the possibility that a non-result
on our main hypothesis is the result of a weak manipulation for reporting. For actual firms, a financial report
does not necessarily reveal the manager’s choices.
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manager with or without financial reporting. Likewise, a dividend paid by a manager is
seen by the investor with or without financial reporting.
Our second manipulation, in the Liquidation treatment, mostly equalizes the power
of the investor and the manager. Specifically, once the manager has made her allocation
decision, the investor has the option of terminating the game at the end of any interim
period 1–5 and receiving 40% of the joint-savings account balance at the time the
liquidation option is exercised. Within the Reinvestment Game, a liquidation option
lessens the relative power of the manager over the investor but can entail a cost of
forgone earnings since early liquidation removes the possibility of larger earnings in later
periods.
The treatment where both reporting and liquidation are present is referred to as the
Both treatment. Our 2×2 design is summarized in Figure 1B.
Our Reinvestment Game differs from a standard multiperiod investment game in an
important way.6 In the standard game, the earnings generated in a given period must be
paid out to either the manager or the investor. Thus, earnings come entirely from new
investment; that is, the funds used to generate earnings depend entirely on the investor’s
decision to continue investing. In the Reinvestment Game, the funds used to generate
earnings come from investment by the investor and reinvestment by the manager. The
fact that funds can be reinvested implies that earnings are subject to compounding effects
– reinvesting an increasing amount of earnings means that the total pie available for
multiplication can overwhelm the total available in the standard game after only a few
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The repeated version of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe’s (1995) “Trust Game.”
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periods.7 This means that the relative power of the manager increases as reinvestment
by the manager grows through time relative to any new investment by the investor.

2.2 Manager behavior in the final period
Experimental economists Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson have incorporated elements
of Adam Smith’s TMS in several experimental research papers (e.g., Smith, 2017; Smith
and Wilson, 2017; 2018). In TMS, Smith analyzes the ethical drivers of why and how we
act as we do. The ethical forces Smith analyzes in TMS have been described as “the other
invisible hand” (e.g., Ashraf, Camerer, and Lowenstein, 2005; McCloskey, 2006) and
provide the foundation for conduct by buyers and sellers in a market (Boulding, 1969).
Smith and Wilson (2019) integrated both invisible hands within a framework that they
call humanomics – a modernized version of TMS. 8 Smith and Wilson’s intent was to
develop a theory that could account for subject behavior in dictator, ultimatum, and trust
games at odds with the predictions of neoclassical economics using utility maximization.
A prominent example is the one-shot trust game of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995),
where an investor can invest up to $10 with a manager, which will triple in value, and
which the manager will divide between the investor and herself. The surprising result
from Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe’s experiment is that investors make positive
investments and managers return positive amounts to the investor; both actions are

7

To numerically illustrate, assume: (i) the game lasts six periods, (ii) the investor always invests five, (iii) the
multiplier equals two in each period, and (iv) the manager reinvests everything in each period. In the
Standard Investment Game there would 60 for the investor and manager to split, compared to 630 in the
Reinvestment game.
8
Smith and Wilson’s 2019 book Humanomics: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the TwentyFirst Century is a blend of theory from both of Adam Smith’s main scholarly contributions.
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inconsistent with the neoclassical economic prediction that investors will not invest
because managers will steal all resources and leave the investor with nothing. More
generally, humanomics offers a theory of how we conduct ourselves in substantive social
interactions where we are aware that our actions can benefit or a harm another person.
Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator is the cumulative result of our experience in judging
others’ conduct. The Impartial Spectator is a mental construct by which we approve or
disapprove of conduct – others’ and our own. The Impartial Spectator judges actions and
motivations without prejudice and classifies such actions as praiseworthy, neutral, or
blameworthy. The Impartial Spectator helps us to see ourselves as others see us – it is an
ideal “internalization of what is approved or not approved by others” (Smith & Wilson,
2019, p. 101). Mueller (2016, 313) suggests that Smith’s Impartial Spectator is a product
of inductive reasoning applied to personal experience and is reflected in “personal tacit
knowledge.”
Smith and Wilson argue that despite being self-interested, we have three
additional desires related to propriety of our actions in economic settings. Beyond
personal wealth, we desire to (1) avoid being seen as blameworthy, (2) take inherently
praiseworthy actions, and (3) have our actions be viewed by others as praiseworthy.
There is heterogeneity in the degree to which different individuals weight these desires.9
Smith and Wilson argue that actions are not selfless but rather are chosen to satisfy these
desires for propriety as perceived by the Impartial Spectator. That is, actions are chosen
to jointly satisfy desires for propriety and personal wealth.

9

See Smith and Wilson (2019, 167) for a formal utility representation of these desires.
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Prior experimental evidence is consistent with the aforesaid in single-period
settings when agents’ actions are always observable (Smith and Wilson, 2017; 2018;
2019). Observability of actions (and the related issues of information asymmetry and its
resolution via financial reporting) has so far been an unexplored topic in this literature
but is the primary focus of this article. By manipulating the observability of managers’
actions in the form of a financial report, we disentangle the effects of a desire to take
inherently praiseworthy actions and a desire to be viewed as praiseworthy.10
A financial report reveals the current period’s earnings and assets. The key
differences that our experimental manipulation induces are that the investor acquires
information about (1) the manager’s choice to reinvest the current period’s earnings
versus take a salary (which reduces reinvestment), and (2) the amount of available
resources from which a dividend can be paid in any period.
In general, we expect that investors will earn greater profits in the Reinvestment
Game when financial reporting is available. To see this, consider a one-period version of
an investment game with possible multipliers similar to those in our experimental setting.
That is, the players play a one-shot investment game with multipliers drawn from a
distribution with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 1,092, and the manager then divides
the total available between herself and the investor.11 We expect that an investor would
earn more from playing this game with financial reporting since a financial report reveals
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Adam Smith (1759) wrote, “The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered
as some sort of proof of praiseworthiness.”
11
The minimum is where the investor invests once and the realized multiplier is 1 in that and subsequent
periods. The maximum is where the investor invests the same amount in each period and the realized
multiplier in every period equals the maximum of 3, so the effective multiplier is equal to 36 + 35 + 34 + 33 +
32 + 31.
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the total amount of resources that the manager divides. Because financial reporting
reveals to the investor the total resources the manager takes, the investor can evaluate
the manager’s resource-sharing decision in terms of its fairness and the manager’s
sacrifice of resources. Within the context of Smith and Wilson’s humanomics model, the
manager’s resource-division choice becomes a praiseable action.12
Within the Reinvestment Game, the theory in TMS suggests that the Impartial
Spectator will guide a manager in choosing how to divide resources after the final period.
The final distribution to the investor is bounded between zero and the total wealth
controlled by the manager at the end of period 6. In the Reinvestment Game, the amount
of resources to be divided after the sixth period ( 𝑊! ) equals l! (𝐼𝑁𝑉! +
𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉" ), where l! equals the multiplier in period 6, 𝐼𝑁𝑉! equals the investor’s period 6
investment, and 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉" equals the amount reinvested by the manager at the end of
period 5.
If we assume that actions are discretely viewed as praiseable (another is benefited),
neutral, or blameworthy (another is harmed), then a manager will be concerned with two
points over the interval [0, 𝑊! ]. The first is the minimum necessary for avoiding blame
(BW). The second is the minimum that must be paid to earn praise (PW). A manager is
guided to set these levels according to what her Impartial Spectator believes to be
appropriate given available wealth, dividends previously paid by the manager, past
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In this thought exercise, as in all treatments, the manager’s final-period action entails no pecuniary cost
since the investor cannot react to such an action after the game is completed.
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salaries taken by the manager, and past investments made by the investor. These
alternatives are ordered by amount as follows: 0 ≤ BW ≤ PW ≤ 𝑊! .
Table 1 shows the effect on the manager’s desires for propriety and personal wealth
at the distribution levels of BW and PW for treatments where no reporting occurs and the
treatments where the investor is informed via a financial report of the terminal wealth to
be divided by the manager. The level at which the final distribution changes from
blameworthy to neutral (BW) or from neutral to praiseworthy (PW) depends on the
context, which includes the history of past investment by the investor as well as prior
dividends to the investor and salaries taken by the manager. That is, BW and PW are
expected to be lower if interim dividends are greater. PW will be higher if prior salary is
more positive, as a higher level is needed to reach an appropriate investor share of
generated wealth. At the same time, higher salary decreases terminal wealth.
We posit that the blameworthy level (BW) is at a minimum equal to the amount
where the investor is made financially worse off by interacting with the manager, a
definition consistent with Rousseau et al. (1998). This means that the investor took a risk
and ceded control to the manager, who succumbed to opportunism and did not
reciprocate the investor; that is, the total of all amounts returned is less than the total of
all investments. A praiseworthy level (PW) is one where, after the final distribution, the
manager has shared an appropriate share of the generated wealth above the investor’s
total investment.
Comparing the choice between a final distribution of zero and BW indicates that a
manager with financial reporting will prefer to pay BW rather than zero only if the utility
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that comes from satisfying a desire for propriety is great enough. This same reasoning
applies for a manager without financial reporting seeking to avoid being blameworthy,
because the investor will know the extent to which dividends have covered the amount
invested.
The distinction between a final distribution viewed as praiseworthy and one viewed
as neutral is more complicated. The loss of monetary utility in PW is greater than the loss
of monetary utility in BW. When the dividend is viewed as neutral, all managers
experience nonmonetary utility by satisfying their desire to avoid being seen as
blameworthy. However, when the distribution is PW, the managers with financial
reporting also experience a utility gain by satisfying their desires to avoid being seen as
blameworthy, to take praiseworthy action, and to be viewed as praiseworthy. The last
desire is satisfied because the investor can assess the dividend as praiseworthy given
knowledge of the wealth generated. Without financial reporting, in the absence of
knowledge about the wealth available for distribution, the investor will not likely view the
same amount as praiseworthy. In this respect, financial reporting allows others to judge
the manager’s final decision; without financial reporting, the manager cannot satisfy her
desire to be viewed as praiseworthy by increasing the distribution to the PW level.
This logic suggests that managers in treatments with financial reporting are more
likely to prefer a final distribution of PW over BW than managers in treatments without
financial reporting. This gives us our first hypothesis:
H1: When financial reports are available that make managerial actions observable, a
manager is more likely to reciprocate with a higher final distribution than would a
similarly situated manager in a treatment without financial reporting, holding past
dividends and salary constant.
15

2.3 Manager behavior during interim periods
In a world without financial reporting, the only means for a manager to satisfy the
desires to avoid being seen as blameworthy and to be seen as praiseworthy is to take an
action visible to the investor. In interim periods 1–5, this means paying a dividend. Yet,
paying an interim dividend has ambiguous effects on the manager’s utility. Although the
manager’s current sharing of resources has a positive effect on manager utility, this utility
gain could be negated by the opportunity cost of lower future earnings. Thus, the net of
these two factors means that paying a dividend may be viewed as either praiseworthy or
neutral. If the action is viewed as praiseworthy, it satisfies the desires to avoid being seen
as blameworthy, to take praiseworthy actions, and to be seen as praiseworthy. However,
if the action is viewed as neutral, paying a dividend increases the manager’s nonmonetary
utility even in the absence of financial reporting, as the manager avoids being seen as
blameworthy.
With financial reporting, the investor knows all manager actions and total available
resources at all times, including reinvestment in interim periods. This implies that a
manager can satisfy her desires for propriety by either reinvesting current earnings or
paying a dividend. From the perspective of the investor, reinvestment increases potential
future earnings because earnings are compounded, even though there is no certainty that
these will be shared. Assume reinvestment is viewed as neutral. In this case, the
manager’s nonmonetary utility increases as she satisfies her desire to avoid being seen as
blameworthy, and her expected monetary utility will increase. If the investor judges
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paying a dividend as neutral, then the manager satisfies her desire to avoid being seen as
blameworthy, but her expected monetary utility will decrease. Because reinvestment can
be observed, the marginal utility to the manager of paying an interim dividend is likely
lower because financial reporting makes her reinvestment choice observable compared
to a world without reporting. Thus, a manager desiring propriety will be less likely to pay
an interim dividend when financial reporting is present because reinvestment is
observable.
From the investor’s point of view, siphoning off a salary and reducing reinvestment
decrease utility. Decreasing reinvestment results in lower future earnings from
compounding – a harmful action that the investor will judge as blameworthy.
Furthermore, taking a salary during an interim period decreases the manager’s utility, as
she has taken a blameworthy action, which, in the presence of financial reporting, is made
known to others. Thus, if a manager elects to satisfy her desire for propriety, then the
manager will take a lower salary in the presence of financial reporting. In combination,
our second hypothesis follows from these predicted effects:
H2: When financial reports are available, managers will take lower interim salaries for
themselves and pay lower interim dividends to the investor, both of which result in
increased reinvestment, compared to a setting where financial reporting is absent.

2.4 Effect of investor right to liquidate
A natural question about our experiment is whether manager behavior within the
Reinvestment Game would change if the relative power of the actors to influence total
gains were more equal. For example, corporate managers’ power in interactions with
investors likely differs in the presence of takeover threats or when managers can be fired.
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To evaluate this, we created two treatments identical to the Baseline and Reporting
treatments described in Section 2.1, except that the investor was given a decision right to
“fire” the manager by liquidating the firm and receiving 40% of the total wealth available
in any period 1–5 prior to the end of the experiment. We label these the Liquidation and
Both treatments. We do not offer specific hypotheses about the effects of the liquidation
option manipulation, except to note that we expect H1 and H2 also to apply to a
comparison between the Liquidation and Both treatments. Instead of stating a specific
hypothesis about the effect of the liquidation option, we instead pose a research question
about the effects of financial reporting in the presence of a liquidation option:
RQ1: Does financial reporting increase manager resource sharing and wealth creation
in the Reinvestment Game to the same extent when a liquidation option is available
that lessens power differences between the manager and the investor?
3

Data Collection
The experiment was conducted at a U.S. research university. A total of 286

participants were recruited from a participant pool consisting primarily of undergraduate
students; each participant was randomly assigned to a single session. There were three
sessions of each of the four treatments. All sessions except one contained 24 participants;
a single session of the Reporting treatment contained only 22 participants. The authors’
institutions obtained institutional review board (IRB) approval for this experiment. The
IRB approval required us not to use deception.
In all treatments, participants were informed that the game would last six periods.
We used the same set of stochastically generated (realized) multipliers for each treatment
so that variation in outcomes would result from variation in behavior. We randomly
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generated unique sequences of six multipliers for each investor–manager pair in the
Baseline treatment and then used these same sequences for investor–manager pairs in
the other treatments. This technique provided variation in multipliers between groups
within a treatment but no variation in the distribution of multipliers across treatments.
Each session lasted approximately 1 hour. Participants were seated at visually
isolated workstations that allowed them to interact anonymously over a local computer
network. An experimenter read the instructions aloud while each participant followed
along with a printed copy of the instructions. The instructions explained the experimental
procedures and payoffs. After reviewing instructions, participants answered several quiz
questions (see the appendix for the instructions and quiz). The experimenter privately
answered any questions regarding the experimental procedures. Each participant was
assigned a role, labeled “Person A” for the investor and “Person B” for the manager, and
remained in that role for the entire experiment.13 In each of six periods, the investor first
made an investment decision, then the manager made an allocation decision, and both
were given feedback (the extent of which was manipulated between treatments). Finally,
the investor had the option to liquidate the partnership (manipulated between
treatments).
Each participant was paid a $7 participation fee in addition to payoffs from the
Reinvestment Game after signing a receipt. Experimental earnings in the Reinvestment

13

We described the roles and actions available to participants using neutral terms to minimize the
possibility of subjects making implicit assumptions about behavior (Haynes and Kachelmeier, 1998).
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Game were exchanged for U.S. dollars at a rate of 10 to $1. On average, subjects earned
$16.85, including their participation fee.
4

Results
Our primary independent variables for our two experimental manipulations,

Reporting and Liquidation, are 1 if present, and 0 otherwise. Each firm (investor–manager
pair) is treated as an independent unit of observation. The significance level is 5%.
We start with summary measures of wealth and payoffs for the investor and manager.
We then examine the manager’s final distribution choice to provide evidence on our first
hypothesis, concerning the final distribution to the investor. We then examine
reinvestment during interim periods (with regard to our second hypothesis). We conclude
by examining the effects of the liquation option.

4.1 Summary measures of wealth and payoffs
Our hypotheses predict how wealth and payoffs are increased with financial reporting.
Before showing evidence about the particular hypotheses, we first show that wealth and
payoffs are indeed greater with financial reporting.
Table 2 shows the wealth generated in each treatment. We conducted an
untabulated two-way ANOVA to assess the influence of Reporting and Liquidation on
wealth. The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 9.31, p < .003,
indicating a significant difference in total wealth generated by firms with reporting (Mean
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= 257.28) compared to firms without (Mean = 137.42).14 The main effect for Liquidation
was insignificant, F(1,139) = 1.05, p = .306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 1.31, p <
.254.
We calculate a measure, efficiency, that equals the total wealth generated by the firm
divided by the maximum wealth that would have been created if (1) the investor had
always invested the maximum, (2) the manager had always reinvested the maximum, and
(3) the firm were not liquidated. Efficiency is shown in the next column of Table 2. We
conducted a two-way ANOVA on the influence of Reporting and Liquidation on efficiency.
The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 6.41, p < .013, indicating a
significant difference in efficiency between firms with reporting (Mean = 45%) and firms
without (Mean = 31%).15 The main effect of Liquidation on efficiency was insignificant,
F(1,139) = 1.05, p = .306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 1.31, p < .254.
Both wealth created and efficiency are greater with financial reporting. As a result,
the payoffs for the investor and the manager increased with financial reporting. The Total
Investor Payoff and the Total Manager Payoff, are shown in Table 2. ANOVA results show
a main effect of Reporting, p < .013 for both payoffs; no significant effect of Liquidation,
p > .111 for both payoffs; and no significant interaction, p > .228 for both payoffs.

14

We perform two robustness checks on this result. First, the result is robust to wealth being distributed
log-normally. An ANOVA on the log of Wealth finds a significant main effect for Reporting, p < .004, but not
for Liquidation or for the interaction (both p-values > .160). Second, the nonparametric Wilcoxon signedranks test indicated that wealth generated by firms with reporting was significantly greater than wealth
generated by firms without reporting, Z = 2.491, p = .013.
15
For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that efficiency by
firms with reporting was significantly greater than efficiency by firms without reporting, Z = 2.704, p < .01.
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4.2 Hypothesis tests
4.2.1 Effects of financial reporting on the final investor dividend
In the final period, the manager’s sole decision is how to divide the final resources
between herself and the investor. The manager’s choice of the final distribution to the
investor is unaffected by the investor’s future behavior because the investor cannot react
in any observable way to the manager’s choice. The manager can only infer any blame or
praise the investor assigns. Likewise, if a blameworthy manager were previously
mimicking a praiseworthy type in periods 1–5, her choice of final distribution would reveal
her blameworthy character.
Our first hypothesis is that a manager will reciprocate past investment to a greater
degree when financial reporting is present, as reporting allows an investor to distinguish
neutral from praiseworthy behavior. Our data analysis for H1 proceeds in four stages.
First, we examine the influence of independent variables Reporting and Liquidation on
the final distribution. Next, we net the final investor distribution (such that the value is
negative if the investor was made worse off for trusting a blameworthy manager, positive
if made better off for trusting, and zero if made whole) and examine the influence of
independent variables Reporting and Liquidation on the net final distribution. Next, we
categorize managers’ period 6 distributions as praiseworthy, neutral, or blameworthy and
evaluate qualitative differences in manager behavior with and without financial
reporting. Last, we test for differences in the level of the final distribution to investors
using a regression model that controls for other variables that affect the final distribution.
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The final distributions per treatment are reported in panel A of Table 3. The mean
and median amounts for the investor’s final distribution are more positive when reporting
is present. For example, the mean (median) equals 46.9 (9.5) for Reporting compared to
21.9 (7.0) for Baseline. The results of a two-way ANOVA model of the influence of
reporting and liquidation on the final distribution to the investor are shown in panel B of
Table 3. The main effect of Reporting was positive and significant, F(1,124) = 7.20, p <
.008, but no significant main effect for Liquidation or the interaction is observed.16
For a given value of the final distribution, it is difficult to judge the appropriateness
of the manager’s choice without considering the investor’s investments and dividends
received. For example, assume the investor has invested $25 over time. A final
distribution of $20 will be judged differently if the investor’s past dividends exceed $25
than if dividends have never been paid. To compensate, we net the final distribution by
subtracting all investments and adding prior period dividends and report the amounts by
treatment in the second column of panel A of Table 3. The results of a two-way ANOVA
model of the influence of reporting and liquidation on the net final distribution to the
investor are shown in panel B of Table 3. The main effect of Reporting was positive and
significant, F(1,124) = 7.20, p < .021, but no significant main effect for Liquidation or the
interaction is observed.
We find similar results for the manager’s final distribution: a main effect of Reporting,
but not significant main effect for Liquidation or the interaction. Given these results

16

This result is robust to assuming that the data are distributed log-normally. When the dependent variable
is the log of final distribution, we find a significant main effect for reporting, p < .021, but not for liquidation,
nor for the interaction (both p-values > .35), using ANOVA.
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(panel B of Table 3), we analyze final distributions across treatments with and without
financial reporting.
Categorizing final investor distributions as praiseworthy or blameworthy requires (1)
a measurable threshold for distinguishing between a blameworthy final distribution and
one that is neutral (BW) and (2) another threshold where the final distribution shifts from
neutral to praiseworthy (PW). One admittedly conservative estimate for BW is the
minimum necessary to ensure that the investor was not penalized for having invested
resources. For purposes of this analysis, we computed BW as equal to
𝑚𝑎𝑥{∑!#$% 𝐼𝑁𝑉# − ∑"#$% 𝐷𝐼𝑉# , 1} . Under this categorization, the cutoff BW does not
depend on financial reporting, as the investor observes investments and dividends in all
treatments. In setting PW, we chose a level such that an investor would be ex post
indifferent to (hypothetically) liquidating the firm after period 5 or investing in period 6.
In this structure, PW = 40% 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉" + 𝐼𝑁𝑉! for each manager–investor dyad. Under
this categorization, the cutoff does depend on financial reporting, as the investor only
sees reinvestment in treatments with financial reporting. This categorization implies that
a final distribution less than BW is classified as blameworthy and a final distribution above
PW is classified as praiseworthy. Observations between BW and PW are categorized as
neutral. This occurred when either an investor invested small amounts and/or the
manager paid dividends in periods 1–5 in excess of investment, leaving little for
reinvestment.
On the basis of these categories, manager behavior changed qualitatively in the
presence of financial reporting. Figure 2 depicts the percentages of observations where
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the final distribution to the investor was classified as blameworthy, neutral, or
praiseworthy for firms with and without financial reporting. The percentages of
distributions classified as blameworthy were similar for firms with and without financial
reporting (about 40% in both cases) – there was no significant difference for the
economies with reporting per the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Z = 0.56, p = .57. In contrast,
financial reporting induced a marked shift in frequency when moving from neutral to
praiseworthy, Z = 2.114, p = .034.17 The frequency of praiseworthy final distributions is
about 40% with reporting versus under 30% without reporting. This finding is consistent
with the proposition that the frequency of managers’ blameworthy actions is invariant to
reporting, as investors do not need reporting to know if they are worse off for trusting;
however, managers are more likely to undertake costly praiseworthy actions only when
these actions are evident via reporting.
The final stage of our data analysis for H1 examines final investor distributions
(reported in panel B of Table 3). The final period’s earnings available to be divided
between the investor and manager will be an increasing function of past investments and
a decreasing function of past dividends and salaries; we control for these effects when
testing H1 with a regression model. To test whether a manager greater reciprocates past
investment more intensely when financial reporting is present, we estimate the
relationship between the level of funds the investor received in period 6 and their prior

17

We perform three alternative specifications to test the robustness of this shift from neutral to
praiseworthy. In the first test, we don’t reclassify cases to neutral when PW was less than BW. In the second
and third tests, we use 45% and then 50% instead of 40% in calculating PW. All cases show significant shifts
in frequency when moving from neutral to praiseworthy with financial reporting (p-values of .031, .040,
and .041 for the three tests, respectively).
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investments, while controlling for dividends received in periods 1–5 and past salaries
taken by the manager:
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽& + 𝛽% 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽' 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 '
+ 𝛽( 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ' + 𝛽) 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠
+ 𝛽" 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀

(2)

Investor Final Distribution equals the dividend paid to the investor in the final period
of the experiment (𝐷𝐼𝑉! ). Reporting is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if financial
reporting is present. Investments2 is the sum of squared past investments, that is, 𝐼𝑁𝑉%' +
𝐼𝑁𝑉'' + . . . +𝐼𝑁𝑉!' . Ostrom and Walker (2003) report that in standard one-shot trust
games, higher investments lead to higher returns on investment (defined as return less
investment scaled by investment). The authors comment that participants who trusted
more were more likely to gain wealth. The analysis suggests a quadratic relationship
between investment and the final dividend returned by the manager. Examining the
distribution of returns in a trust game, Gómez-Miñambres, Schniter, and Shields (2020)
show superior fit when using a quadratic versus a linear model of investment.
PriorDividends is the sum of past investor dividends, weighted by the expected effect of
dividends on the final-period distributed earnings, that is, 𝐷𝐼𝑉% × 2" + 𝐷𝐼𝑉' ×
2) +. . . +𝐷𝐼𝑉" × 2% . PriorSalary is the sum of past salaries taken by the manager, also
weighted by the expected effect of salary on the final-period earnings, that is,
𝑆𝐴𝐿% × 2" + 𝑆𝐴𝐿' × 2) +. . . +𝑆𝐴𝐿" × 2% .
Regression results are reported in panel C of Table 3. The estimation sample excludes
firms that have been liquidated, or firms with zero earnings in the final period, because
the manager has no observable choice in these cases. The main coefficient of interest is
26

𝛽( , which captures the marginal effect of past investment on the final distribution in the
presence of financial reporting. We expect this coefficient to be positive.
Consistent with Ostrom and Walker (2003) and Gómez-Miñambres, Schniter, and
Shields (2020), we find that the coefficient on squared investments was positive and
significant. Most importantly, the estimated value of 𝛽( equals 0.456, which was
significantly greater than zero at p < .05. The total coefficient on investment with
reporting (𝛽' + 𝛽( ) was significantly greater than zero at p < .001 and was approximately
73% larger than without reporting (𝛽' ), giving support to H1. The intercept for economies
with financial reporting (𝛽& + 𝛽% ) was not significantly different from economies without
reporting (𝛽& ), and the coefficients on prior dividends and prior salaries were both
negative and significant, as expected.18 This result is consistent with managers choosing
to transfer more wealth to the investor when reporting allows that choice to be seen as
praiseworthy.
4.2.2 Reinvestment in interim periods
Our second hypothesis is that managers will be more likely to reinvest during interim
periods when a financial report is available to the investor. Evidence for H2 is shown in
Table 4. We conducted a two-way ANOVA to evaluate the influence of reporting and

18

We evaluated the robustness of these results by estimating models similar to equation (2), where we
keep the same functional form but apply different weights to investments and/or prior dividends and salary.
Alternative model 1 uses the sum of investments (𝐼𝑁𝑉! + 𝐼𝑁𝑉" + . . . + 𝐼𝑁𝑉# ) rather than the sum of
squared investments, which results in lower adjusted R-squared than the model reported, indicating poorer
fit. Alternative model 2 weights prior dividends and salaries by the number of periods left (i.e., 𝐷𝐼𝑉! × 5 +
𝐷𝐼𝑉" × 4+. . . +𝐷𝐼𝑉$ × 1) rather than the exponential weight used above. This also results in lower
adjusted R-squared compared to reported results. Despite the alternative weightings, all models have
comparable directional effects; that is, prior dividends and salary decrease the final dividend, investment
increases it, and the financial reporting increases return on investment.
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liquidation on average reinvestment. The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of
F(1,139) = 10.74, p < .002, indicating a significant difference between reinvestment in
firms with (Mean = 40.34) and without (Mean = 20.81) reporting.19 The main effect for
Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 0.02, p = .882, as was the interaction, F(1,139) =
2.66, p = .106.20
We find that not only did managers reinvest more with financial reporting, the
proportion of earnings that could be reinvested was greater. We report the average
proportion of earnings reinvested in Table 4. We conducted a two-way ANOVA to
evaluate the influence of reporting and liquidation on reinvestment. The main effect of
Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 5.36, p = .022, indicating a significant difference
between reinvestment in firms with (Mean = 68.7%) and without (Mean = 57.8%)
reporting. The main effect for Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 1.68, p = .194, as
was the interaction, F(1,139) = 0.81, p = .371
Recall that the greater reinvestment hypothesized has to be the result of lower
dividends, lower salary, or greater investment. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the
influence of reporting and liquidation on interim dividends. The main effect of Reporting
yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 5.60, p < .019, and the main effect for Liquidation was
insignificant, F(1,139) = 1.05, p = .306. The interaction was significant, F(1,139) = 4.45, p
< .037. Simple main effects analysis showed significantly lower dividends with reporting

19

For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that reinvestment
for firms with financial reporting was significantly higher than it was for firms without reporting, Z = 2.530,
p = .011.
20
All untabulated ANOVA results reported in this section are on the average per participant as reported in
Table 4. All reported results are robust to examining interim period measures in a repeated measures
ANOVA.
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when liquidation was possible (comparing the Liquidation treatment to the Both
treatment, p < .001) but no significant difference in dividends when liquidation was not
possible (Baseline treatment vs. Reporting treatment, p = .865).
We also conducted a two-way ANOVA of the influence of reporting and liquidation on
manager salaries. The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 3.35, p =
.069, indicating a marginal difference between salaries taken when firms had reporting
(Mean = 3.73) and when they had no reporting (Mean = 2.61). 21 The main effect for
Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 0.32, p = .306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) =
0.05, p = .832.
Although we did not predict any changes in investment, we do find that investors
invested significantly more in firms with financial reporting. A two-way ANOVA on the
effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 6.78, p < .011, indicating a significant
difference in level of investments between firms with (Mean = 3.94) and without (Mean
= 3.37) reporting.22 The main effect for Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 0.32, p =
.306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 0.05, p = .832. This result is consistent with the
trust game of Reitz, Sheremeta, Shields, and Smith (2013), where the ability to observe
subsequent outcomes in a three-person trust game resulted in greater investment
(although they do not find a difference in trustworthiness with regard to the amounts
returned to the investor).

21

For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that manager
salaries for firms with reporting were smaller than for firms without reporting, Z = 2.671, p < .01.
22
For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that investment
for firms with financial reporting was significantly greater than for firms without financial reporting, Z =
2.498, p = .013.
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The effect of greater investment and reinvestment is higher joint savings in
treatments with financial reporting. This effect is powerfully obvious in Figure 3, where
we plot the average joint-savings account balances of nonliquidated firms across periods.
This figure shows that the effect of compounding was greater with financial reporting.
In the Reinvestment Game, investment creates, in part, the upper bound for both
dividends and salaries. Yet, despite higher investment in the presence of financial
reporting, we find lower dividends and lower salaries. The combined effect of greater
investment and reinvestment is shown in Figure 4, where we report the frequency of high
investment and high reinvestment relative to a benchmark of 50% of what was possible
– the investor investing at least half the endowment and the manager reinvesting at least
half of the earnings. There was a significant shift in investment and reinvestment (i.e., to
the upper right-hand quadrant) for firms with reporting versus firms without, Z = 2.586,
p < .01.
Cumulatively, these results support H2. The observed manager choices are consistent
with a desire to avoid blame and/or to seek praise in interim periods. Without financial
reporting, these desires can inhibit reinvestment. With reporting, all else equal, these
same desires create wealth for both investor and manager, as shown in Table 3. We next
explore the effects of reporting and liquidation on total wealth.

4.3 Effects of investor’s right to liquidate
We find no difference in the number of firms liquidated due to reporting. Seven of 36
investors exercised the liquidation option in the Liquidation treatment where financial
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reporting was not possible, and 6 of 36 investors exercised the option in the Both
treatment, where financial reporting was present.
As discussed in the prior section, we find no significant main effect of liquidation on
wealth, efficiency, investment, or reinvestment. At the same time, we did find a
significant main effect for reporting.
To determine the effect of financial reporting controlling for liquidation, we construct
three measures of maximum wealth generation and compare results between treatments
with and without financial reporting. The first measure, Maximum Investment, is a binary
measure equal to 1 if the investor invested his full endowment every period, and 0
otherwise. The second measure, Maximum Reinvestment, is a binary measure that equals
1 if the manager fully reinvested earnings in periods 1–5, and 0 otherwise. The last
measure is Maximum Efficiency, which is the cross-product of Maximum Investment and
Maximum Reinvestment. These measures are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that the percentage of managers who consistently reinvested the
maximum possible was greater with financial reporting. When liquation was not available,
32.4% of the managers in the Reporting treatment reinvested the maximum amount in
every period compared to only 8.3% in the Baseline treatment, Z = 2.493, p = .013. A
similar effect is observed for treatments where liquidation is possible – 25% of Both
managers always reinvested the maximum, compared to only 2.8% in the Liquidation
treatment, Z = 2.707, p = .007.23

23

This result is robust to running both logit and ANOVA analyses, where we find a significant main effect of
reporting but no significant effect of liquidation or interaction.
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The percentage of firms for which we observe maximum efficiency, that is, both
investment and reinvestment are the maximum possible, is also reported in Table 5.
When liquation was not possible, only 2.8% of the firms in the Baseline treatment
achieved maximum efficiency, compared to 17.1% in the Reporting treatment – a
significant difference, Z = 2.016, p = .043. When liquidation was possible, no firm achieved
maximum efficiency in the Liquidation treatment, but 13.9% of firms did in the Both
treatment with financial reporting. This difference is significant, Z = 2.302, p = .021.24 In
regard to RQ1, the results we have obtained here – a higher maximum reinvestment and
higher maximum efficiency with financial reporting, both with and without an option to
liquidate – show that financial reporting improves wealth creation.
We fail to find a significant difference in maximum investment after controlling for
liquidation. When liquidation was not available, 25% and 37% of investors invested their
entire endowments in the Baseline and Reporting treatments, respectively. When
liquidation was available, 19% and 28% of investors invested their entire endowments in
the Liquidation and Both treatments, respectively.25
5

Conclusion
We experimentally evaluate whether financial reporting has economic value in a

sparse setting where contracting is not possible. We posit that financial reporting leads a
manager to alter her behavior in anticipation of an investor’s evaluation of the manager’s

24

This result is robust to running ANOVA analysis, where we find a significant main effect of reporting but
no significant effect of liquidation or interaction. Logit analysis was not appropriate, as the Liquidation
treatment had no successes.
25
This result to robust to running both logit and ANOVA analysis, where we find a significant main effect of
reporting, but no significant effect of liquidation or interaction.
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conduct, as revealed by a report of earnings and amounts reinvested in the firm. The
manager’s anticipation of the investor’s evaluation activates the manager’s approvalseeking behavior, and this translates into the manager choosing more efficient resource
allocation.
Our finite-period Reinvestment Game is similar to a corporation in that an investor’s
initial investment provides “seed capital” required for the firm to operate, but
reinvestment allows managerial power over firm resources to grow relative to investors’
power. Our main experimental manipulation was the presence of a financial report
revealing to the investor each period’s earnings and assets reinvested by the manager. A
second manipulation granted the investor a right to liquidate the firm before the final
period, which allowed us to evaluate whether the effect of reporting changes when the
investor and the manager have more equal power.
We hypothesized with this experiment that financial reporting has two effects on
managerial actions. First, because reporting reveals the manager’s final resource
allocation, the manager can expect the investor to judge unambiguously whether the
manager’s choice was generous or selfish. We therefore hypothesize that the manager
will pay a higher final distribution to the investor, controlling for past dividends and
salaries, when reporting is present. Second, financial reporting makes interim
reinvestment observable and subject to the investor’s moral evaluation. Thus, a manager
under a condition of financial reporting will be more likely to avoid interim dividend
payments and personal compensation so they can reinvest funds, thus obtaining higher
earnings. We find strong evidence supporting both hypothesized effects – other things
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being equal, managers pay higher final distributions and reinvest larger amounts when
financial reporting is present.
Our findings provide support for the long-standing view that financial reporting
provides “sunlight” that renders managerial behavior transparent and leads to more
virtuous managerial conduct (Brandeis, 1914, 92). Economics-based research in
accounting assumes a conflict between investors’ interests and managers’ interests (e.g.,
Dye, Glover, and Sunder, 2015). Our findings suggest that financial reporting involves
more foundational aspects of human ethics and the means we use to infer others’ motives
based on observable outcomes. Thus, the consequences of financial reporting may result
from forces that have a deep evolutionary history in humans. We encourage future
research that can evaluate the generalizability and magnitude of the effects we document
by extending our work into other experimental and archival settings.
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Appendix

7.1 Instructions (Liquidation Treatment)
Introduction
This is an experiment on decision-making. Various research agencies have provided funds
for this research. During the experiment you will earn money in an experimental currency
unit (ECU). We will denote ECU with the $ symbol. At the end of the experiment earned
ECU will be converted to US dollars at a rate of 10 ECU to 1 US dollar. Your earnings are
dependent upon your decisions, other’s decision, and upon chance. Earnings will be added
to your show-up payment. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment and nobody
except the cashier will know what you have earned. It is very important that you remain
silent throughout the experiment and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you
will not be paid. We expect, and very much appreciate, your adherence with these policies.
Everyone in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into a partnership with an
assigned role of either Person A or Person B. You and the other person in your partnership
will make choices that will determine your payoffs. You will be partnered with the same
person throughout the entire experiment. You will remain in the role of Person A or Person
B for the entire experiment.
The Experiment
You will be asked to make deposits into a Joint Savings account and personal accounts in
a number of periods. The total amount deposited in the Joint Saving account is subject to
multiplication every period allowing it to grow over time. The experiment will last 6
periods.
Each period proceeds as follows.
First, Person A receives $5 in new funds and then decides how much of the $5 to send to
Person 2 with the remainder going to his/her personal account. Person A can send $0, $1,
$2, $3, $4 or $5. The amount Person A does not send to Person 2 is automatically deposited
into his/her personal account (denoted as the Person A account).
Next, the amount sent by Person A and the Joint Savings account balance from the prior
period are added together. The total is multiplied by 1, 2, or 3. All values for this multiplier
are equally likely. Person B receives the multiplied amount and then decides how to
distribute the amount received by making deposits into either (1) the Person A account,
(2) the Person B account, or (3) the Joint Savings account. These three deposits must
equal the amount received by Person B.
Person A and Person B keep the amounts deposited into their personal accounts.
Before describing the stages in detail, we will explain what is meant by Joint Savings
account.
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Joint Savings account.
At the beginning of period 1, the Joint Savings account is empty. When Person B receives
a multiplied amount in second stage of the first period, Person B decides on a split of the
amount received through deposits into three accounts:
(1) Person A account (amount returned to Person A),
(2) Person B account (amount kept by Person B), and
(3) Joint Savings account (amount carried forward and subject to multiplication
next period).
The amount carried forward in the Joint Savings account at the end of the first
period will be added to the amount that Person A sends in the second period. This
total will be multiplied and Person B receives the multiplied total. Person B then
decides on the 3-way split of the total multiplied amount into the Person A account,
the Person B account, and the Joint Savings account to be carried forward into the
next period. This process is repeated every period of the experiment and illustrated
in the diagram below.

Deposit (new balance)

Joint Savings
account

Prior balance
Send

Received

Person A

Person B
Multiplier

Deposit

Person A
account

Deposit

Deposit

Person B
account
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Numerical Example
Suppose Person A sends $3 to Person B in period 1. Since this is the first period and the
Joint Savings account is empty, only the $3 sent by Person A is multiplied. Suppose the
random multiplier for period 1 equals 2. Then, the multiplied total that Person B receives
is $6 ($3 ´ 2). Person B next decides on a 3-way split of the total $6 received. One
possibility is for Person B to keep $1 by depositing this amount into the Person B account,
return $3 to Person A by depositing this amount in the Person A account, which leaves $2
to be carried over to the Joint Savings account for period 2.
Now the Joint Savings account equals $2 at the start of period 2. If Person A sends $4 to
Person B in period 2, the total to be multiplied is $6 ($2+$4). If the multiplier for period 2
is 3, then the total multiplied amount equals $18 ($6 ´ 3). If Person B deposits $4 into the
Person A account and $6 into the Person B account, then $8 ($18 – $4 – $6) is the Joint
Savings account balance to be carried over to the third period.
The Joint Saving account grows exponentially, where the rate of growth is the
multiplier. Exponential growth differs from linear growth, where the growth amount is
just a constant number.
To illustrate the difference, consider the following example of linear growth. Imagine that
you invest $2 today, and every day the investment grows by $2. It grows today,
tomorrow, and so on for 5 days. At the end of the first day you have $4, tomorrow $6, the
next day $8, the next day $10, and on the last day $12.
Now consider an example of exponential growth, where you put $2 in the first day, and
that doubles each day. At the end of the first day you have $4, tomorrow you have $8, the
next day $16, the next day $32, and $64 at the end of the day 5. This is depicted below:
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Day 1

Day 2
Linear Growth

Day 3

Day 4

Day 5

Exponential Growth
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Now we illustrate how Person A’s and Person B’s will input their decisions.
Person A’s Decision
Every period Person A receives $5 new funds and decides how much to send to Person B.
The remainder, if any, is deposited into the Person A account. For example, if Person A
sends $5 to Person B, then nothing can be deposited into the Person A account.
Alternatively, if Person A sends nothing to Person B, then $5 is deposited into the Person
A account.
The amount sent by Person A and the Joint Savings account at the end of the prior period
are added together and multiplied by 1, 2, or 3 (all values are equally likely). The amount
received by Person B equals the multiplied amount (multiplier times the total of amount
sent and Joint Savings account).
Starting in Period 2, Person A must decide whether to continue or dissolve the partnership
with Person B. If Person A decides to dissolve the partnership, then Person A receives 40%
of the balance in the Joint Savings account at that point, which is automatically deposited
into the Person A account. The remaining 60% is deposited into the Person B account.
The partnership is now over and both Person A and Person B will not make any further
decisions in the experiment. In this, and all future periods, the $5 in new funds is
automatically deposited into the Person A account. If Person A decides to continue, then
Person A decides how much to send to Person B.
Person A will see the following on their screen:

Screen 1
Person A must decide how much to send to Person B by entering an amount in the blank
box. Person A can send $0, $1, $2, $3, $4 or $5.
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Person B’s decision
In stage 1, the amount sent by Person A’s is added to the Joint Savings account from the
prior period. Recall that the Joint Savings account at the beginning of period 1 is empty.
The total is multiplied before Person B receives it. The total is multiplied by 1, 2, or 3
(there is an equal chance of each value).
Person B decides on how the multiplied amount received is to be divided between deposits
into three accounts. Person B decides how much to deposit in the Person B account, into
the Person A account, and remainder is deposited into the Joint Savings account. If the
total amount received by Person B equals zero, Person B cannot make any decision except
to deposit zero into each account.
Person B will see the following on their screen:

Screen 2
Person B must decide how much to deposit in his/her account and how much into Person
A’s account by entering amounts in the blank boxes above. Person B can deposit $0, $1,
… up to the amount received, into each account, but the total deposited into both accounts
cannot exceed the amount received. Whatever is not deposited into the Person B account
or Person A account is automatically deposited into the Joint Savings account. For the
example screen above, recall the Joint Savings account is empty at the start of Period 1.
During the experiment, the amount sent by Person A, the multiplier, and amount received
denoted with ‘?’ will be filled in.
In the last period, Person B decides on a 2-way split of the multiplied amount received by
him / their instead of the 3-way splits in previous periods. S/he decides how much of the
total amount to deposit in to Person A account and how much to deposit in Person B
account.
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Feedback
Throughout the experiment Person A and Person B will see the history of their decisions.
However, the information Person A sees differs from the information Person B sees.
For example, Person A sees the following upon their screen at the end of period 1. Amounts
denoted with a ‘?’ will be filled in. Since it is the first period, beginning balances are zero.
After each period is complete, the table will be updated with a new row.
Person A History
My Account History

Period #

Beginning
Balance

I Deposited

Person B
Deposited

Ending
Balance

1

0

?

?

?

Screen 3
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The information shown to Person B differs. For example, Person B will see the following
at the end of period 1. During the experiment, amounts denoted with a ‘?’ will be filled in
depending on Person A’s and Person B’s decisions. Since it is the first period, beginning
balances are zero. After each period is complete, the table will be updated with a new row.
Person B History
My Account History
Beginning
Balance
0

Period #
1

I Deposited
?

Ending
Balance
?

Person A Account History
Period #
1

Beginning
Balance
0

Person A
Deposited
?

I Deposited
?

Ending
Balance
?

Earnings History
Period #
1

Beginning
Joint Savings
0

Person A
Send
?

Multiplier
?

Earnings
?

Joint Saving Account History
Period #
1

Earnings
?

Deposited Into
Person A Account
?

Deposited Into
My Account
?

Ending
Balance
?

Screen 4

44

Notice that Person B is shown the multiplier, the Joint Savings Account, and how much
they deposited into their own account (Person B account). Person A will never be directly
told the multiplier, the balance in the Joint Savings Account, or the amount Person B
deposited into the Person B account. This difference between what Person A sees and
what Person B sees is summarized below:
Information
Person A deposits into the Person A account
Person B deposits into the Person A account
Balance of the Person A account
Person B deposits into the Person B account
Balance of the Person B account
Person A sends to Person B
Person B deposits into the Joint Savings account
Multiplier drawn
Multiplied amount received by Person B

Who sees it
Person A and Person B
Person A and Person B
Person A and Person B
Person B
Person B
Person A and Person B
Person B
Person B
Person B

Completion of the Experiment
Once all periods have been completed, you will be paid your earnings in US dollars plus
your 7 US dollar show up fee. Experimental currency (ECU) will be converted to US
dollars at the rate of 10 ECU to 1 US dollar.

7.2 Quiz Questions
Treatment differences noted in italics. Correct answer denoted in parenthesis.
1. How many people are in the partnership?
a. 1
b. 2
(b)
2. The ending balance in the Person A account and the Person B account can
never decrease from last period?
a. True
b. False
(a)
3. The ending balance in the Joint Savings account can never decrease from last
period?
a. True
b. False
(b)
4. Will both the amount send by Person A and the last period’s Joint Savings
account balance be multiplied before Person B decides how to split it?
a. Yes
b. No
(a)
5. Is each multiplier value (1, 2, or 3) equally likely in each period?

45

6.

7.

8.

9.

a. Yes
b. No
(a)
Person A will be explicitly told the multiplier and the balance in the Joint
Savings account?
a. Yes
b. No
(a: if Reporting or Both treatments)
(b: if Baseline or Liquidation treatments)
Suppose that Person A sends 3 to Person B, and Person B and deposits 5 in the
Person A account. How much was added to the Person A account this period?
a. 3
b. 5
c. 7
d. 8
(c)
Suppose Person B receives 9, deposits 2 to the Person A account, and deposits
3 to the Person B account. What is the Joint Savings account balance?
a. 2
b. 4
c. 6
d. 9
(b)
Suppose the Joint Savings account balance is 40 at the start of the period and
Person A chooses to dissolve the partnership. How much of the Joint Savings
account balance gets automatically deposited into the Person A account?
a. 0
b. 16
c. 24
d. 40
(b: only asked in Liquidation and Both treatments)
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Table 1
Manager Choices of Final Distribution
Panel A: Possible Values to Investor Chosen by Manager

0

BW
Blameworthy
Levels

Legend:

PW
Neutral
Levels

EARNINGS6
Praiseworthy
Levels

BW = Minimum level need to avoid blame
PW = Minimum level to obtain praise from Impartial Spectator
EARNINGS6 = Earnings in the final period (Maximum Amount to Investor)

Panel B: Comparison of Manager Utility choosing Final Distribution with and without
Financial Reporting

LEVEL

Blameworthy
Pay 0
Neutral
Pay BW
Praiseworthy
Pay PW

Reporting?
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Monetary
payoffs

Avoiding (or
not) seen as
blameworthy

Acting praise
(blame)
worthy

Seen as
praiseworthy
(blameworthy)

>0

<0

<0

<0

>0

<0

<0

<0

>0

0

0

>0

0

0

0 or > 0

0 or > 0

>0

>0

smaller than
paying 0
smaller than
paying 0
smaller than
paying BW
smaller than
paying BW

> 0 and equal
to paying BW
> 0 and equal
to paying BW
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Table 2
Summary Measures

Treatment
Baseline
No Reporting, No Liquidation
N = 36
Information
Reporting, No Liquidation
N = 35
Liquidation
No Reporting, Liquidation
N = 36
Both
Reporting, Liquidation
N = 36
Mean, median, (SEM) reported.

Wealth
169.9
104.0
(26.5)
252.3
133.0
(48.3)
105.0
78.0
(12.8)
262.2
139.5
(54.9)

Efficiency
36%
29%
(4%)
45%
36%
(5%)
26%
19%
(3%)
45%
35%
(5%)

Total
Investor
Payoff
44.3
35.0
(4.4)
64.7
33.0
(13.7)
46.1
36.9
(5.1)
103.9
37.5
(26.8)

Total
Manager
Payoff
125.6
60.5
(25.1)
187.6
97.0
(44.5)
58.9
47.5
(9.3)
158.3
86.0
(30.6)

Total Investor Payoff: The balance of the Investor’s private account at the end of the game. The
sum of the 6 periods endowment, less the sum of investments, plus any interim dividends
received, plus the amount received in final distribution or liquidation.
PAYOFF!"#$%&'( = '

)

*+,

&

5 −'

*+,

INV* + '

-./ {2,&}
*+,

DIV* + INVESTOR_FIN& , where

T = min{6, period liquidated}
DIV) ,
INVESTOR_FIN& = <
40% × Joint Savings account& ,

T=6
T<6

Total Manager Payoff: The balance of the Manager’s private account at the end of the game. This
equals the sum of the salary kept by the Manager in interim periods (and not reinvested) plus
the amount kept by the Manager in the final distribution or liquidation.
&

PAYOFF56"67$( = '

*+,

SAL* + MANAGER_FIN& , where

T = min{6, period liquidated}
SAL) ,
MANAGER_FIN& = <
60% × Joint Savings account& ,

T=6
T<6

Wealth: The sum of the Investor payoff and Manager payoff at the end of the game.
WEALTH = PAYOFF!"#$%&'( + PAYOFF56"67$(
Efficiency: The wealth divided by the hypothetical wealth (given the realized multiplier values)
that might have been assuming the Investor invested the maximum amount each period, the
Manager reinvested the maximum in the interim periods.
WEALTH⁄(5 + (5 + (5 + (5 + (5 + 58! )8" )8# )8$ )8% )8&
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Table 3
Final distribution
Panel A: Amounts by Treatment
Treatment
Baseline
No Reporting, No Liquidation
N = 35
Information
Reporting, No Liquidation
N = 34
Liquidation
No Reporting, Liquidation
N = 29
Both
Reporting, Liquidation
N = 30
Mean, median, (SEM) reported.

Investor Final
Distribution
21.9
7.0
(4.5)
46.9
9.5
(14.9)
22.2
9.0
(6.7)
92.9
11.5
(33.0)

Net Investor
Final
Distribution
14.9
5.0
(4.5)
35.7
6.0
(14.0)
18.6
8.0
(6.3)
77.8
6.0
(31.9)

Manager Final
Distribution
110.5
45.0
(26.5)
180.9
92.0
(46.5)
47.4
23.0
(11.0)
152.0
55.5
(37.3)

Investor Final Distribution: The amount the Manager put into the Investor’s private account in the
final period, if the Manager could choose.
Net Investor Final Distribution: The final distribution shifted such that value positive if made
better, negative if worst off, and is zero otherwise.
)

DIV) − '

9+,

𝐼𝑁𝑉9 + '

2

9+,

𝐷𝐼𝑉9

Manager Final Distribution: The amount the Manager put into their own private account in the
final period. If the final period’s earnings where zero, or the firm had been liquidated by the
investor, then the Manager could not choose, and as such, the number of observations is
reduced.
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Panel B: ANOVA results
Results of Reporting and Liquidation on the Investor Final Distribution
Source
S.S.
d.f.
F-ratio
Reporting
72,867
1
7.20
Liquidation
17,072
1
1.69
Reporting x Liquidation
16,511
1
1.63
Note: The model had an F ratio of F(3,124) = 3.38, p = .020.
Results of Reporting and Liquidation on the Net Investor Final Distribution
Source
S.S.
d.f.
F-ratio
Reporting
50,918
1
5.44
Liquidation
16,671
1
1.78
Reporting x Liquidation
11,718
1
1.25
Note: The model had an F ratio of F(3,124) = 2.74, p = .047.
Results of Reporting and Liquidation on the Manager Final Distribution
Source
S.S.
d.f.
F-ratio
Reporting
243,587
1
6.60
Liquidation
67,301
1
1.82
Reporting x Liquidation
9,328
1
0.25
Note: The model had an F ratio of F(3,124) = 2.80, p = .043.

p-value
.008
.196
.204

p-value
.021
.185
.265

p-value
.011
.179
.616

Panel C: Results of best fit model
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽: + 𝛽, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽; 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ; + 𝛽< 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ;
+ 𝛽= 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀
Variable
Intercept
Report
Investments2
Report × Investments2
Prior Dividends
Prior Salary
Number of Observations
R Squared
Adjusted R Squared
Note: ** p < .05; *** p < .01
F(5, 122) = 4.52, Probability > F = .0008

Coefficient Value
25.981***
-25.498
0.625***
0.456**
-0.194**
-0.180***
128
0.279
0.249

Reporting: Dummy variable equal one for Reporting and Both treatments.
Investments2: sum of squared investments, 𝐼𝑁𝑉,; + 𝐼𝑁𝑉;; + ⋯ 𝐼𝑁𝑉); .
Prior Dividends: weighted dividends paid to the investor in interim periods, 𝐷𝐼𝑉, × 22 +
𝐷𝐼𝑉; × 2= + ⋯ + 𝐷𝐼𝑉2 × 2, .
Prior Salary: weighted salaries kept by the Manager in interim periods, 𝑆𝐴𝐿, × 22 +
𝑆𝐴𝐿; × 2= + ⋯ + 𝑆𝐴𝐿2 × 2, .
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Table 4
Investment and Reinvestment

Treatment
Baseline
No Reporting, No Liquidation
N = 36
Information
Reporting, No Liquidation
N = 35
Liquidation
No Reporting, Liquidation
N = 36
Both
Reporting, Liquidation
N = 36
Mean, median, (SEM) reported.

Average
Investment
3.2
3.2
(0.2)
3.8
4.2
(0.2)
3.5
3.7
(0.2)
4.1
4.7
(0.2)

Average
Dividend
to
Investor
2.5
2.0
(0.4)
2.4
2.2
(0.5)
3.4
3.0
(0.4)
1.7
1.0
(0.3)

Average
Salary
Taken by
Manager
3.6
2.9
(0.7)
2.4
1.6
(0.5)
3.8
3.7
(0.5)
2.8
2.2
(0.7)

Average
Reinvestment
by Manager
26.1
14.5
(4.5)
35.9
24.0
(6.0)
15.5
8.2
(3.3)
44.7
22.2
(8.6)

Average
Percentage
Reinvested
by
Manager
63.0
63.4
(5.0)
69.7
76.3
(4.9)
52.6
49.4
(3.9)
67.8
71.4
(5.0)

Average Investment: The average investment in periods (1-6) if the firm had not been liquidated,
else the average investment before the firm was liquidated.
> 𝐼𝑁𝑉
9
'
, where 𝑇 = min {6, period liquidated}
𝑇
9+,
Average Dividend to Investor: The average amount returned by the Manager in interim periods
(1-5) if the firm had not been liquidated, else the average amount returned by the Manager
before the firm was liquidated.
> 𝐷𝐼𝑉
9
'
, where 𝑇 = min {5, period liquidated}
𝑇
9+,
Average Salary Taken by Manager: The average amount the Manager put into their own private
account in interim periods (1-5) if the firm had not been liquidated, else the average amount
the Manager put into their own private account before the firm was liquidated.
> 𝑆𝐴𝐿
9
'
, where 𝑇 = min {5, period liquidated}
9+, 𝑇
Average Reinvestment by Manager: The average amount the Manager put into the joint savings
account in interim periods (1-5) if the firm had not been liquidated, else the average amount
the Manager put into the joint savings account before the firm was liquidated.
> 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇
9
'
, where 𝑇 = min {5, period liquidated}
𝑇
9+,
Average Percentage Reinvested by Manager: The average amount the Manager put into the joint
savings account in interim periods (1-5) as defined above divided by the earnings to be
distributed.
> 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 /𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆
9
9
'
, where 𝑇 = min {5, period liquidated}
𝑇
9+,
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Table 5
Measures of Maximum Efficiency by Treatment
Percentage of Economies Where in All Periods Maximum:
Treatment
Investment
Baseline
25.0
N = 36
(7.3)
Reporting
37.1
N = 35
(8.3)
Liquidation
19.4
N = 36
(6.7)
Both
27.8
N = 36
(7.6)
Mean, (SEM) reported.

Reinvestment
8.3
(4.7)
32.4
(8.1)
2.8
(2.8)
25.0
(7.3)

Efficiency
2.8
(2.8)
17.1
(6.5)
0.0
(0.0)
13.9
(5.8)

Maximum Investment: A dummy variable which is one if the Investor invested their entire
endowment.
1,
𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑁𝑉9 = 5
𝑀𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇9 = <
0,
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
Maximum Reinvestment: A dummy variable which is one if the Manager reinvested all earnings
she received.
1,
𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉9 = 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆9
𝑀𝐴𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇9 = <
0,
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
Maximum Efficiency: A dummy variable which is one if the Investor invested their entire
endowment and the Manager reinvested all earnings she received.
𝑀𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇9 × 𝑀𝐴𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇9
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8

Figure 1

Panel A: Baseline Version of the Reinvestment Game
Investor

In each period t is
endowed with 5,
invests £ 5 and
keeps remainder

INV

Manager

EARNINGSt =
lt(INVt + REINVt-1)
Where lt = 1, 2 or 3
equally likely each
period

EARNINGS

Receives earnings
then pays dividend
to investor, keeps
salary, and reinvests
where DIVt + SALt +
REINVt = EARNINGSt

KEPT
Investor’s
private
account

DI V

Joint
Savings
account

INV
RE

SAL
Manager’s
private
account

In the last period reinvestment is not possible due to game’s end. The manager thus chooses final distribution
such that DIV6 + SAL6 = EARNINGS6.
Reporting treatments: Investor sees earnings, reinvestment, balance of the joint savings account, salary, and
the balance of the manager’s private account. Otherwise, the Investor only sees the investment, the remainder
kept, and the dividend.
Liquidation treatments: At the end of periods 1-5, the investor can elect to dissolve the firm, which moves 40%
of the joint savings account balance into the investor’s private account and moves the remainder into the
manager’s private account. Future endowments are moved directed into the investor’s private account.

Panel B: Experimental Treatments

No Liquidation
Liquidation

No Reporting

Reporting

Baseline
Liquidation

Reporting
Both
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Figure 2
Categorization of Final Distribution to Investor

Percentage of Firms

40

30

20

10

0

Without Financial Reporting
Blame−worthy

With Financial Reporting
Neutral

Praise−worthy

NOTE: If the investor distribution was less than 𝐵𝑊 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥{∑)9+, 𝐼𝑁𝑉9 − ∑29+, 𝐷𝐼𝑉9 , 1}, then we
classify the final distribution as blameworthy; if it was greater than 𝑃𝑊 = 40% 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉2 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉) ,
then we classify the final distribution as praiseworthy, otherwise we classify the distribution as
neutral. In those cases where PW was less than or equal to BW, we classify the final distribution
as neutral.
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Figure 3
Joint Savings Account Over Time

Joint Savings Account Balance
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Period
Without Financial Reporting

With Financial Reporting

NOTE: The average balance of the Joint Savings account of the non-liquidated firms graphed over
the six periods. As the firm is dissolved in the last period and managers are required to distribute
earnings between themselves and the investors, we report the earnings before the final
distribution in the last period.
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Figure 4
Bubble Charts of Investment and Reinvestment
Without Financial Reporting

With Financial Reporting

less than 50%

less than 50%

Reinvestment

Investment

50% or more

50% or more

less than 50%

Reinvestment

50% or more

50% or more

less than 50%

Investment

Note: Within each chart the firms are classified by investor behavior on the x-axis (average
investment was less than or more than half the maximum the investor could invest of their
endowment) and manager behavior on the y-axis (average reinvestment the less than or more
than half maximum percentage the manager could reinvest of earnings). The bubble size reflects
the number of economies falling into the classification, where the smallest bubble is 1.5 percent
of firms in the treatment and the largest is 61 percent of firms in the treatment.
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